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David Hume and Intelligent Design: A
Counter Criticism
Benjamin Martin
Introduction
David Hume, the celebrated Scottish philosopher of the 18th century,
wrote a work entitled Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, in which he
provides a detailed criticism of several theistic arguments. In the Dialogues there
are found 3 interlocutors, each of whom approaches natural religion from a
different philosophical standpoint. Cleanthes is the character upon whose
argumentation we will mainly focus, as he is the defender of the a posteriori
argument from Intelligent Design. Philo, another interlocutor, is a philosophical
skeptic who opposes Cleanthes' arguments. Out of the three, many consider
Philo's positions to be representative of those of Hume himself. The purpose of
this paper is to analyze Philo's objection to Cleanthes' Intelligent Design argument
(ID), and to show that the analogy within the ID argument is strong and that it
warrants belief in the existence of a designer of the universe.

Cleanthes’ Intelligent Design Argument
First, let us bring into view the specific argument with which we are
dealing, and then the grand scheme of the Dialogues' treatment of the subject.
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Cleanthes and Demea are both pious believers in God as well as philosophers of
religion. Demea favors the a priori arguments for the existence of the divine
being, and he does so seemingly because he is unwilling to accept argumentation
unyielding of perfect and certain results.1 Cleanthes, however, brings experience
into play by arguing a posteriori for the existence of the divine being. Cleanthes
introduces an inductive argument from analogy that goes as follows: The world
resembles a machine that is made up of infinite numbers of smaller machines. The
complexity and degree at which each machine operates in unison with its
counterparts is unfathomable, and beyond any capabilities of “human
contrivance,” but even still, Cleanthes claims, they resemble exactly the sorts of
machines that humans can produce. Therefore, since human machines and the socalled “machines” found in nature are analogous, then so are their human and,
arguably, their divine designers.2

Philo’s Objection
Demea is briefly given the time to express his problems with the ID
argument. The main thrust of this portion of the Dialogues, however, involves the
dispute between Cleanthes and Philo. Philo's immediate charge is that the analogy
in the ID argument is weak. He demonstrates that lesser similarity between effects

David Hume, “Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,” in Modern Philosophy: An Anthology of
Primary Sources, ed. Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
2009), 609.
2
Hume, “Dialogues,” 608.
1
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would indicate lesser similarity between causes.3 Since the Earth, he argues, is not
similar to a house, we have no reason to analogize the architect of the house to the
architect of the universe.4 He goes on to point out that things can look to have
been designed that are not in fact designed, and that we need to have some
experience of the designer in order to actually know that he or she designed the
object.5 Finally, Philo points out that, even though some aspects of the universe
seem to be designed, this is not the case for everything. We should not then claim
that there is a designer behind the entirety of the universe when only certain parts
of it bear signs of design.6 These are the main arguments that Philo raises against
Cleanthes' ID position, and we will now analyze their logical patterns more
closely.

Does the Machine-Information Analogy Work?
The first of Philo's objections concerns the analogy between house and
universe. Again, Cleanthes asserts that, “you will find it [the universe] to be
nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser
machines.” However, there are several objections to the notion that we can
compare nature to a machine. Boudry and Pigliucci refer to this as the machineinformation analogy, and they write a strong criticism against the use of such a

Hume, “Dialogues,” 609.
Ibid., 609.
5
Ibid., 610.
6
Ibid., 611-612.
3
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term in the context of science education.7 They spend some time specifically
analyzing Hume's dialogues in the formulation of their argument, during which
they reference Philo's example of the ship. Philo explains that the prima facie
conclusion we might draw about a beautiful ship is that its designer must be an
excellent artist and craftsman, but more probably it is just a dull laborer who has
repeated the instructions of those who came before him. Who knows then, how
many failed attempts at world-designing could lie before the actual world in
which we live?8
Boudry and Pigliucci claim to agree with Hume’s assertion that using this
sort of reasoning is "deceptive," and "defective," but they are misunderstanding
Hume’s objection.9 Hume is making an epistemological objection to the notion
that anyone could know whether the designer is perfect, if he exists at all. We do
not even have a critique of design by Hume in this ship example, because the
example presumes design in order to attack the further inference to a perfect
designer that is frequently made. No matter how many failed ship attempts took
place by mediocre ship builders before the final product, it remains evident that
they have been designed all along. Boudry and Pigliucci are simply missing the
point, and while they do not like the analogy for purposes of education, that does

7
M. Boudry and M. Pigliucci, "Why Machine-Information Metaphors are Bad for
Science and Science Education," Science & Education 20, (Spring 2011): 457.
8
Hume, “Dialogues,” 619.
9
Boudry and Pigliucci, “Machine-Information Metaphors,” 457.
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not make it a weak analogy. It is important that we then discuss what are the
particular aspects of a man-made machine that might correspond analogously to
natural phenomena.
William A. Dembski defines an argument from analogy as one that,
“argue[s] that two things share some feature because they share some other
features.”10 He gives the example of a watch and a living organism. Between the
two we can find similarities and dissimilarities. The specific attributes that
Dembski uses for his example are, “functional interdependence of parts,
adaptation of means to ends, [and] self propulsion.”11 This is by no means an
exhaustive list, but it is a good beginning for our purposes here. A watch would
not tell time without the hands, and the hands would not turn without the gears;
we see then that both are necessary for the whole to work just as an organism
might require a simultaneously functioning heart and brain in order to live.
Dembski makes a very good point here, namely that analogy requires disanalogy
in order to be distinct from identity.12 For every set of objects we wish to
analogize, there must be qualities that cannot be analogized, otherwise A is not
just similar to B; but A is B. The points of dissimilarity may even be far more
numerous than those of similarity without invalidating the inference. We need

10
William A. Dembski, The Design Revolution: Answering the Toughest Questions
About Intelligent Design (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 224.
11
Dembski, Design Revolution, 224.
12
Ibid., 224.
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dissimilarity, and yet it is largely upon dissimilarity that Hume builds his
criticism.

Philo’s Straw Man Argument
Cleanthes seems to do a good job of making this clear when he presents
his argument. When he states that the causes must resemble each other as the
effects do, he adds that the designer is, “somewhat similar to, the mind of man,
though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the
work which he has executed.”13 This becomes a prominent point of attack for
Philo. He cannot resist berating Cleanthes over his anthropomorphism, taking
analogies of the universe compared to houses, furniture, and other machines as
being obviously absurd.14 Philo says to Cleanthes, “I never should expect any
success from its [human reason's] feeble conjectures in a subject so sublime and
so remote from the sphere of our observation.”15 What we see here on Philo's part
is that he is counting obvious dissimilarities as if they were intended to be
similarities.
Philo's attempt to discredit ID in this fashion is a straw man. For example,
if we say that both a comfortable armchair and the universe are similar effects and
that they must therefore have similar causes, then the qualities that bind the

Hume, “Dialogues,” 608.
Ibid., 611.
15
Ibid., 612.
13
14
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analogy together would have to be narrow enough to avoid absurd conclusions.
We do not wish to intend that both the human designer and the divine designer
need a nice place to relax and to spread out their feet. Rather the qualities that
bind the two together might be as simple as agency or power. To compare the
supreme being to the human mind is not to attempt to house God in a skull with a
brain, or to degrade the idea of God in any other such way, yet, Philo talks of
being, “scandalized,” by the degradation of the supreme being brought on by the
comparison of him to the lowly human builders of machines.16 Are we to view
this analogy as supposing that God too has a dirty pair of boots for when he
undertakes universe-creating, just like the human builder? We would not be
representing Cleanthes argument well if that were our position, and while Philo
does not explicitly come to these conclusions, it is clear that he is implying that
the analogies carry over more than they are really supposed to. I submit that the
original form of the argument avoids these problems when it uses the term,
“proportionality.” Cleanthes says in effect that, while God has a mind just as
humans do, the extent of the greatness of God's mind is (at least) in line with the
grandeur and greatness of creation.17 There does not have to be any overlap in the
nature of the human and divine mind save that they are minds and thus capable of
thought, purpose, and design.

16
17

Hume, “Dialogues,” 610.
Ibid., 608.
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Parts to Whole Objection
Lastly, in our analysis of Philo's objections to Cleanthes' ID argument, we
will look at Philo's charge of the parts-to-whole fallacy. Philo claims that there are
objects that appear to be designed and objects that do not, and that therefore we
cannot infer from the designed parts, a designer of the whole. It seems to be true
that if there were undesigned material mixed in with designed material in the
universe, then that would be problematic if we wished to say there is a universal
designer. Philo cites various raw materials such as wood and brick as examples of
objects that bear no mark of design on their own.18 They have to be organized into
a mechanism or pattern of some sort in order for us to conclude that they require a
designer for their being. Philo is making a couple of assumptions here that are
worth mentioning. Roy Clouser states that Hume admitted of an appearance of
design in the world, but ultimately believed that that appearance is misleading in
the same way the sun 'appears' to rise and set.19 This same principle, however, can
be flipped on Hume. If we can so easily be misled into believing that design exists
in an object, then surely we can just as easily be misled into believing that there is
no design when in fact there is. Philo's thought seems to pertain to obviously
mechanical contraptions, but Cleanthes' argument referred to, “an infinite number

Hume, “Dialogues,” 611.
Robert T. Pennock, Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical,
Theological, and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002), 530.
18
19
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of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what
human senses and faculties can trace and explain.”20 Philo should recognize the
entirely legitimate possibility that we live in a world in which everything that
appears to be designed is undesigned and everything that appears to be
undesigned is designed. With that being said, the position I will advocate for here
is that all matter is designed. If all matter is designed then there is no parts-towhole fallacy, because making an inference from one out of an entire universe of
designed objects that the universe is in fact designed in all of its parts, would be
valid. Since there can be sensory equivalence between any designed or
undesigned object (with regard to whether or not they are designed), we can avoid
the parts-to-whole fallacy.

Conclusion
In conclusion, we have examined the nature of the Intelligent Design
argument as presented by Hume through the character Cleanthes, and we have
analyzed the objections of Philo along the way. We conclude that the original
argument as given by Cleanthes' in Hume's Dialogues is a strong analogy that
warrants belief in a divine being. The objections, mainly given by Philo do not
ultimately stand up against the ID argument. This is because analogy and
disanalogy go hand-in-hand, and a string of accusations over anthropomorphism

20

Hume, “Dialogues,” 608.
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only misses the point of the relevant qualities that are being utilized for
comparison. Finally, we have demonstrated that Hume's skepticism works against
him as well as for him in that there would be sensory equivalence between totally
designed worlds and partially design worlds, and that in the case of the totally
designed world, the parts-to-whole fallacy does not apply.
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